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1. Introduction 
 
In 1991 at the bottom of the UK recession 61% of all debt held by small firms was 
short-term debt, and the majority was bank loans. As conditions improved over the 
1990s bank loans as a share of all finance obtained outside the firm fell, while the ratio 
of short-term to total debt increased to around 75%. Small firms it seems were more 
dependent on bank finance than larger firms in the recession, although some would 
have received no external finance from banks at all. As conditions improved small 
firms obtained more external finance, but even in the better times small firms were 
only able to obtain 65-70% of the increase in resources that large firms could obtain 
from banks for a similar degree of improvement in their net worth. In other words, the 
sensitivity of lenders to indicators of net worth was much lower for small firms than 
for larger firms. A similar story could be told for young firms, and firms with above 
average debts and risk.
2   
These  characteristics  indicate  the  changing  financial  composition  of  firms’ 
balance sheets at different stages of the monetary and economic cycle, but it also 
differences with the characteristics of the firm. But why should these compositions 
change? To some extent this may be a feature of the changing demand conditions, 
with implications for investment and employment, but it may also be a feature of the 
financial environment – the monetary climate and the credit conditions facing firms at 
these  times.  The  changing  composition  of  corporate  finance  provokes  several 
questions. First, can we relate differences in the composition of debt between tight and 
loose periods of monetary policy to firm characteristics like size, age, indebtedness or 
risk? We would need to control for the effects of the economic cycle to do so, and we 
follow a methodology employed in an earlier study which identifies the contributions 
of  the  economic  cycle,  the  monetary  cycle  and  firm-specific  characteristics  on 
financial composition. Second, do differences in companies’ financial compositions 
matter for real activity of firms such as inventory and employment growth? Some 
evidence is emerging to suggest that access to external finance influences inventory 
investment (Guariglia, 1999, Small 2000, Huang 2003) and employment (Nickell and 
Nicolitsas 1999) among UK firms. Although this paper is squarely addressed towards 
                                                            
2 Data are drawn from the FAME database provided by Bureau van Dijk, which is described in more 
detail in section 3 of this paper.    3 
the experience of the United Kingdom, further research on the behaviour of other 
financially developed economies would be a useful extension to research.
3  
 
1.1 The Modgiliani-Miller theorem 
According to the Modigliani-Miller theorem, which asserts that a firm cannot increase 
its value by changing the composition of its liabilities, changing compositions of credit 
on the balance sheet should not matter  for real activity, nor should the source of 
finance  be  of  any consequence to the firm. Marginal  investment decisions should 
depend only upon the expected rate of return on a project relative to some ‘constant’ 
average cost and not on the source of finance. There should be no preference between 
internal sources of funds from retained earnings and finance from sources external to 
the firm. Therefore the distinction between intermediated bank finance and market 
finance from the sale of corporate bonds and equity should be irrelevant.  
In  reality,  however,  preferences  exist  between  types  of  finance  and  the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem only holds when capital markets are perfect.  Myers and 
Majluf (1984) indicate that in an imperfect world firms have preference orderings over 
alternative sources of finance which rank internal sources, based on retained earnings, 
above external sources, such as trade credit, bank borrowing, and non-bank finance. 
The hierarchy of finance derives from the additional costs associated with external 
sources of finance that can be pecuniary or non-pecuniary, i.e. price and non-price 
terms and conditions, which external providers of finance attach to credit provision. 
These give rise to an ‘external finance premium’, which must be paid to secure credit 
from sources outside the firm. This is the basis for preferences towards internal, rather 
than external finance and towards lower cost market finance rather than bank finance. 
  Theoretical attempts to justify the existence of the external finance premium 
have focused on agency costs associated with asymmetric information in the credit 
market. Under imperfect information, borrowers have a better idea of their likelihood 
of  defaulting  on  a  loan  than  do  lenders,  and  this  creates  agency  costs  with  the 
possibility  of  adverse  selection  and  moral  hazard,  (see  Jaffee  and  Russell,  1976, 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Adverse selection arises from the unobservable risks that 
lenders incur when they use the price of borrowing to ration credit. The higher costs of 
borrowing increases the proportion of risky firms that seek credit since the higher 
                                                            
3 Some research on the Euro zone has begun to compare the experiences in various economies (see 
Angeloni et al. 2003, Bond et al. 2003, Chatelain et al. 2003.    4 
costs  of  borrowing  can  only  be  met  by  those  investors  with  high  returns  and  the 
associated high risks. Hence an attempt to ration credit using a pricing mechanism can 
backfire. Moral hazard, on the other hand, arises from the unobservable objectives of 
the firm and the incentives that asymmetric information creates for firms to conceal 
their  true  performance.  Firms  may  disguise  their  actual  returns  from  investing 
borrowed funds in order to avoid repayment of the loan, or alternatively they may 
engage  in  more  risky  projects  than  the  lender  would  choose  (if  the  lender  could 
observe the choice made by the firm) in order to make higher returns. Once again 
higher rates on loans may create unintended consequences for the lender.      
To  counter  the  adverse  effects  of  asymmetric  information  through  adverse 
selection and moral hazard, banks have developed as specialist institutions with the 
capability  to  overcome  these  problems  through  their  ongoing  depositor-lender 
relationships  with  firms.  They  can  match  their  liability  structure  to  the  term  to 
maturity of loans and gather information on the financial background of companies 
(see  Leland  and  Pyle,  1977;  Fama,  1985;  Himmelberg  and  Morgan,  1995).  This 
reduces  the  exposure  of  banks  to  costs  incurred  through  adverse  selection  (see 
Diamond, 1984) it can also minimize the likelihood that borrowers will default when 
they are in a position to pay back the loan because the banks have superior information 
than the market about financial health from the close relationship they forge with 
borrowers. Banks are potentially able to use these advantages over arms length lenders 
in credit markets to offer credit to borrowers who might be excluded from other forms 
of external finance. However, these forms of credit from banks come at a price, since 
the banks must cover their costs of maintaining a close relationship with firms. 
 
1.2 Structure of the paper 
This  paper  explores  the  relationship  between  monetary  policy,  the  interactions 
between borrowers and lenders in the credit market, and the real decisions of firms 
exhibited by inventory investment and employment responses. 
  We offer a brief review the literature on the credit channel, demonstrating the 
development of the methodology over the last decade. Here we do not attempt to be all 
encompassing but we highlight the important themes. The starting point is the effort to 
distinguish  between  supply-side  and  demand-side  responses  in  credit  markets  to 
monetary  tightening.  If  we  can  control  for  demand-side  influences  any  remaining 
influences can be attributed to changes in supply responses giving a clear picture about   5 
the relationship between the creditor and the borrower. The use of ratios of different 
types of credit to total credit allows composition effects to be explored in financial 
structure,  while  identifying  the  shifts  in  composition  with  the  supply  side  (c.f. 
Kashyap et al. 1993, Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996). The use of disaggregated, firm-
level data has allowed for the heterogeneity of financial circumstances to filter through 
into these results. Previous results based on aggregated data were limited in this regard 
since they could only report the average response of the ‘representative’ firm, even 
though firms differed considerably in terms of size, liquidity, risk, and so on.   
 
1.3 Purpose, method and findings 
An exploration of the links between monetary policy tightening, the financial 
composition,  and  the  real  investment  and  employment  responses  of  firms  is  the 
purpose  of  this  paper.  The  reported  results  give  an  indication  of  the  direction  of 
change of the composition of finance and of the real decisions from a panel of 16,000 
UK manufacturing firms over the period 1990-1999. Our sample includes periods of 
tight and loose monetary policy and an episode of credit market tightening.      
The findings we report indicate a substantial response to monetary policy in 
the composition of corporate finance as rates are tightened, implying that the extent to 
which the Modigliani-Miller theorem is violated is substantial. This indicates that the 
‘external  finance  premium’  is  sizeable,  which  motivates  the  financial  accelerator 
mechanism as a driver of cycles in real variables. Not only is the effect noticeable, but 
the impact of monetary policy is asymmetric. The far reaching effects of monetary 
policy tightening affect all firms but they affect small, risky and indebted firms far 
more than others. These firms are the ones that are most constrained by tightening 
monetary policy operating through credit supply channels.  
We find that the growth rates of inventory investment and employment are also 
affected  by  the  composition  of  corporate  finance  as  monetary  policy  tightens  or 
loosens.  We focus on inventory investment and employment growth as indicators of 
real activity that are relatively responsive over a medium-term horizon. While many 
studies have considered fixed-term investment, the horizon is much longer for this 
type of investment than for inventory investment or for employment. Since it depends 
on  the  firm’s  own  assessment  of  future  prospects,  which  is  not  only  difficult  to 
measure but creates its own complications as documented in Bond et al. (2004), it is   6 
more straightforward to concentrate on inventory investment and employment growth. 
In all probability these real decisions are likely to be highly positively correlated. 
 
2. The Development of the Methodology 
2.1 The credit channel, bank lending, and balance sheets 
The traditional mechanisms by which monetary policy affects real activity operate 
directly through the impact of interest rates, expectations about future interest rates or 
inflation, asset values and exchange rates. As far as firms are concerned the direct 
effect of a change in interest rates weakens their balance sheets by increasing short-
term interest payments on existing debt which reduces their cash flow. The higher cost 
of borrowing and the rejection of marginally unprofitable projects reduces investment 
levels. This mechanism operates even in a perfectly efficient capital market.  
When  there  are  credit  market  imperfections,  however,  the  credit  channel 
becomes  operative.  Whilst  the  monetary  transmission  mechanism  has  traditionally 
focused on the endogenous supply of liquidity at an interest rate determined by the 
central bank, which refers to the liabilities side of the banking sector’s balance sheet, 
the credit channel operates through the banks’ asset side. The credit view is supported 
by the twin-pillars of the balance-sheet channel and the bank-lending channel. In other 
words the balance sheet channel and the bank lending channel are two mechanisms by 
which the influence of monetary policy can operate through credit supply.  
The balance sheet channel indicates that business cycles may be propagated to 
the extent that the state of firms’ balance sheets affects their ability to borrow from 
external sources of various types. The crucial link is between the availability of funds 
and a borrower’s net worth. The true worth of a firm is not known under imperfect 
information  and  therefore  indicators  of  creditworthiness  such  as  cash  flow, 
profitability  and  previous  loan  history  are  used  by  financial  markets  or  financial 
intermediaries  as  measures  of  financial  health.  Monetary  policy  changes  can  be 
propagated and amplified through the credit channel as the reduction in cash flow, and 
the present discounted value of assets for collateral, reduces access to funds for future 
investment. Endogenous credit cycles and accelerator effects generate cycles in real 
variables as a result of credit market imperfections c.f. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). 
The  bank  lending  channel  focuses  exclusively  on  bank  loans  as  a  distinct 
component of external finance since for some firms they are the primary source of 
loanable funds. The effects of a monetary contraction are magnified by the reduction   7 
in  loans  supplied  by  banks  (see  Gertler  and  Gilchrist,  1994,  Kashyap,  Stein  and 
Lamont, 1994) which amplifies the demand-side effects on expenditure decisions of 
the private sector. The extent to which the bank lending channel is important depends 
on the substitutability between internal and external sources of funds and between 
bank lending and other forms of external finance. Under certain circumstances firms 
may resort to borrowing from banks (even at a higher rate of interest) if they cannot 
obtain funds elsewhere. Small and medium sized firms in particular may be unable to 
access other markets for funds and therefore will be dependent on banks for external 
sources of funds (see Kashyap and Stein, 1993; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Bernanke 
and Gertler, 1995). The absence of available substitutes gives rise to dependence on 
sources of funds from banks and imparts a particular leverage from bank lending to 
real activity. Hence, the bank lending channel is an extension of the argument that 
banks are special. 
These arguments provide the theoretical basis for the transmission of monetary 
policy shocks to the corporate sector via the credit channel, but their impact, and the 
duration of the cycles they may create, is an empirical matter.  
 
2.2 Evidence of credit channels on financial composition 
The  empirical  evidence  for  the  credit  channel  is  difficult  to  assess.  Measures  of 
financial health and the tightness of the credit market have demand-side as well as 
supply-side  effects.  Some  researchers  have  used  aggregate  data  to  determine  the 
importance of the credit channel. The bulk of the empirical studies are addressed to the 
United States, where a well-developed commercial paper market offers an alternative 
(non-bank) source of funds for corporations. But other studies have been carried out 
on Japanese firms, which draw loans from insurance companies as the main form of 
non-bank financing (see Hoshi et al., 1993), and firms in European countries, where 
bank finance is the main source of external finance (see Schantarelli, 1995, Sauve and 
Scheuer,  1999,  Allen  and  Gale,  2000,  Angeloni  et  al.  2003,  Bond  et  al.  2003, 
Chatelain et al. 2003)  
A representative example of such a study using aggregate data from the United 
States is the paper by Bernanke and Blinder (1992). This research confirms that bank 
lending  to  firms  contracts  after  a  lag  at  times  of  monetary  policy  tightening  as 
measured by the spread of the Fed Funds over Treasury Bill rates and by dummies 
variables  indicating  recessionary  conditions  based  on  ‘Romer  dates’  (Romer  and   8 
Romer, 1990), which are derived from the careful reading of Fed minutes using the so-
called  ‘narrative’  approach.
4  There  are,  however,  significant  difficulties  when 
interpreting  aggregate  data  since  they  do  not  discriminate  between  demand-  and 
supply-side  effects  on  adjustments  to  credit  balances.  Since  a  positive  correlation 
between bank loans and indicators of economic activity could arise from the demand 
side as well as from the supply side, these studies are inconclusive about the evidence 
for  a  supply-side  theory  such  as  the  credit  channel.  They  can  only  document  the 
impact of monetary policy on corporate credit in total.  
 
2.2.1 Demand versus supply effects 
Attempts to resolve the identification of the credit channel led researchers to identify 
robust indicators of monetary policy shifts that allowed them to separate demand and 
supply effects. Comparison of the ‘mix’ of bank lending to total external funding at 
points when there were monetary contractions, rather than the aggregate values of 
bank  lending  and  other  credit,  helped  to  distinguish  whether  changes  to  credit 
obtained  from  banks  and  other  sources  arise  from  contractions  in  demand  or 
reductions  in  supply  (see  Kashyap,  Stein  and  Wilcox,  1993  and  Oliner  and 
Rudebusch, 1996). Demand-side influence is thought to affect both numerator and 
denominator, leaving the ratio unchanged if the magnitude of the changes is broadly 
equal, while supply-side influences will lead to a noticeable effect on the numerator 
alone.  
Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) use a simple framework in which a loans 
market provides funds for investment activity. Firms face a loan supply from banks 
that  is  driven  by  monetary  policy,  but  is  cushioned  to  some  extent  by  banks’ 
adjustment of their portfolios on the asset side of their balance sheets. An alternative 
                                                            
4 The use of Romer dates has been widespread in dating business upturns and downturns. Besides 
the use of Romer dates in Bernanke and Blinder (1992), they are used by Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1994). The methodology of the Romers based on the reading of FOMC minutes to identify periods 
when Federal Reserve policy switched to a tougher stance against inflation gave rise to the so-called 
Romer dates. , the economy experienced a substantial decline in production and employment. The 
Romers interpret their findings as strong evidence for the effect of monetary policy on real economic 
activity. More recent investigations of monetary policy have taken a very different approach to the 
data, but they have reached broadly similar conclusions. A common methodology is to try to identify 
“monetary policy shocks” where variations in monetary policy cannot be predicted by conventional 
economic variables. While the literature has not agreed on the means to identify such shocks, the 
identification of “monetary policy shocks” which cause output and inflation to vary can be used as an 
alternative to Romer dates to explore the impact on the supply of credit.   
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source of finance is provided through commercial paper issue. Loans and commercial 
paper are imperfect substitutes to banks and firms. Firms must decide on the mix 
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where  L,  P,  M,  I,  α
*,  rl  and  rp  denote  loans,  commercial  paper,  money  supply, 
investment, the mix, lending rate and paper rate, respectively. The model yields the 
following insight: the impact of a change in the monetary stance on supply of loans 
and paper is a function of the mix, and the impact on the mix is a function of the 
wedge  between  lending  and  paper  rates  (given  assumptions  of  imperfect 
substitutability between loans versus paper as bank assets and corporate liabilities, the 
wedge is non-zero).  
Equation (1) implies that changes to bank lending can arise from two sources. 
Changes to the level of investment and to the mix between bank and non-bank finance 
can both cause bank lending to change as monetary policy alters. Equation (2) shows 
that a monetary change has the opposite effect on commercial paper finance, so that a 
reduction in money supply reduces investment and thus the demand for all source of 
finance as well as paper finance, but the demand for paper finance may increase as a 
result of substituting paper finance for loan finance. The proposition that monetary 
policy affects the desired composition of finance (the desired mix being given by α*) 
if the paper and loans are not perfect substitutes can be observed from equation (3).  
Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) test the impact of tight monetary policy in 
the US on the ratio (mix) of bank loans to the sum of commercial paper and bank loan 
using  aggregate  data.  Monetary  policy  tightness  is  determined  with  reference  to 
‘Romer dates’ mentioned previously, the Federal Funds rate and the spread between 
rates  on  Federal  Funds  and  Treasury  paper.  Their  empirical  evidence  for  the  US 
shows that tight monetary policy leads to a shift in the firms’ external finance from 
the bank loans towards commercial paper. The decline in bank credit can be ascribed 
to a reduction in the bank loan supply rather than reduction in the demand for the   10 
bank loans because the ratio is not dependent on demand-side influences. The fact that 
there is also an increase in the volume of the commercial paper issuance relative to 
total short-term external finance offers support for the bank lending channel. This 
result implies that bank loans, commercial paper and other form of finance that are 
liabilities of firms must be imperfect substitutes.  
 
2.2.2 Dealing with firm heterogeneity 
Criticism of this result has been raised because the use of aggregate data does not 
allow for the impact of heterogeneity between firms. A significant contribution that 
allows  for  types  of  firms  in  a  disaggregated  setting  can  be  found  in  Gertler  and 
Gilchrist  (1994),  which  analyses  the  different  responses  of  small  versus  large 
manufacturing firms to monetary policy in an imperfect financial environment. In 
their paper, they consider evidence on the importance of the financial propagation 
mechanism  for  aggregate  activities  as  a  result  of  monetary  shocks.  Interest  rate 
increases weaken firms’ balance sheets by increasing short-term interest payments on 
debt (reducing cash flow) and by lowering the value of collateral assets that constrain 
the borrowers’ spending. They also work indirectly as the deterioration of the balance 
sheet  leads  to  a  drop  in  firms’ spending, and as sales  in general fall this  further 
reduces their ability to borrow. The timing of these mechanisms accords with the 
empirical evidence for US economy which shows that the decline in the credit volume 
and economic activities generally coincide after a 6-9 month period following the 
tightening  of  monetary  policy.  The  study  emphasises  a  substantial  decline  in  the 
activity of small firms during a period of tight monetary policy (mainly due to falling 
inventory demand), and it is noticeable that the responses of the small and large firms 
to monetary policy differs considerably. Small firms rely proportionally more heavily 
on information-intensive financing, that is, they use more bank finance relative to 
mean manufacturing industry, and generally do not issue so much commercial paper. 
The informational frictions that increase the cost of external finance apply mainly to 
younger firms with a high degree of idiosyncratic risk, and to the firms that are not 
well  collateralised.  Small  firms  rely  on  intermediary  credits,  while  large  firms 
generally use direct credits, including equity, public debt, and commercial paper. The 
financial constraints are likely to bind for small-scale firms during the recessions 
rather than in boom periods. Prior to recessions the growth of short-term debt for 
large firm rises before declining as the recession sets in.   11 
Oliner  and  Rudebusch  (1996)  also  use  firm  level  data  to  exploit  the 
heterogeneity of firm responses, raising their point as a ‘comment’ on the aggregate 
data study by Kashyap et al. (1993). The points raised and the response from Kashyap 
formed a major debate over the methodology of testing for evidence of the credit 
channel.  Oliner  and  Rudebusch  argue  that  the  Kashyap  et  al.’s  methodology  was 
flawed in two respects: it used aggregate data that could not distinguish between large 
and small firms, and it relied on an identification procedure for determining supply 
responses to monetary policy shocks based on the relative movement of bank loans 
and commercial paper, but only large firms issued commercial paper. This led Oliner 
and Rudebusch to conclude that Kashyap et al. could not distinguish shifts in the 
relative importance of bank loans and commercial paper for small firms because small 
firms  issued negligible amounts of commercial paper. Their  solution  to these two 
flaws  was  to  use  disaggregated  data  that  allowed  small  and  large  firms  to  be 
distinguished from each other, and to redefine the mix to include all types of non-bank 
debt. The conclusions were that there is no evidence that monetary policy reduces the 
bank  loan  supply  relative to  non-bank finance, but  a broad credit  channel can be 
confirmed,  functioning  through  informational  asymmetries  faced  by  all  types  of 
borrowers. They argue that it is the larger firms rather than the small firms, who rely 
more on bank finance, and that these issue commercial paper during the contraction.  
This set their results at odds with those of Kashyap et al. (1996) who argue that 
even  if  Oliner  and  Rudebusch  were  correct,  the  reallocation  of  funds  away  from 
smaller  firms  towards  the  large  firms  would  not  work  against  the  bank  lending 
channel. Kashyap et al. (1996) argue that the results in Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) 
are unsurprising for small firms since the modified mix variables on which the results 
hinge are meaningless for small firms that have almost no other types of debt except 
bank debt, while for large firms the results are not comparable (since the measure of 
the mix differs between the original paper and the comment). What is not in doubt is 
the existence of different responses to monetary policy according to firm size, and the 
reply from Kashyap et al (1996) concedes this point  
In  section  3  and  4  we  discuss  the  impact  across  a  wider  range  of 
heterogeneities for UK firms. There are some differences in the nature of corporate 
finance between the US and the UK that used to be taken into account – such as the 
lack of a deep commercial paper market in the UK, but the principle of taking ratios of 
different sources of finance to evaluate the supply response to monetary tightening and   12 
loosening can be applied by examining firms’ short-term debt relative to total debt or 
their total debt to current liabilities over the monetary policy cycle for different types 
of firms.   
   
2.3 Real decisions – investment, inventories and employment 
2.3.1 Theoretical models 
The asymmetric information argument which develops a relationship between access 
to external finance and indicators of net worth, creditworthiness and collateral assets 
also generates endogenous cycles in real variables. The paper by Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997)  is  a  classic  statement  of  this  relationship.  Hubbard  (1994)  and  Bernanke, 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) indicate that there is an external finance premium, which 
increases with declining net worth of the borrower, and this in turn affects investment, 
employment and production.  
Using a more general version of the model of Kashyap et al. (1993) we can 
illustrate the point. We can define a simple model of the demand for a real variable by 
R = Rd(Y,k), where R = I, H, N equates to investment, inventory investment or labour 
demand. The demand for each real variable is dependent on the business cycle and 
therefore is sensitive to income, Y, and is also sensitive to the cost of external finance, 
k. Since external finance is obtained from the market and from banks in proportions 
(1- α) and α, we can define the cost of external finance as
5: 
k = rp +α
*(rl – rp) – f(α*)                        (4) 
Here α∗ is  the  optimal  proportion  of  bank  to  market  finance,  and  f(α*)  is  a 
relationship indicating the benefits of a relationship between the bank and the firm, 
increasing in the proportion of credit obtained from banks, α *. 
Changes in the real variable are then given by the relationship dR = Rydy + 
Rkdk  and the resulting equation for the determinants of changes to investment gives:   
dR = Rydy + Rkdrp +Rkα
*(drl – drp)                                              (5)  
                                                            
5 The cost of capital reflects the cost of obtaining funds from two sources: bank loans and commercial 
paper markets according to their respective interest rates. Here f(α*) is a relationship indicating the 
benefits of a relationship between the bank and the firm, increasing in the proportion of credit obtained 
from banks, α*. Kashyap et al. (1993) use this simplified arrangement to reflect the cost of capital as a 
weighted average, but this is controversial since Stiglitz (1973) argues that we need to focus on the 
marginal source of funds, not a weighted average.  The pecking order of finance which is central to 
Fazzari et al. (1988) has a similar implication.     13 
The third term on the right hand side is a product of the financial mix and the change 
in the spread between loan and paper rates of interest. It disappears when loans and 
commercial  paper  are  perfect  substitutes,  leaving  the  changes  in  income  and  the 
commercial paper rate of interest as the sole determinants of changes in real activity.  
When  loans  and  paper  are  imperfect  substitutes,  the  hypothesis  that  financial 
composition affects real decisions can be tested by adding the share of bank loans in 
total  short-term  finance  (the  mix  variable)  as  an  independent  variable  into  an 
investment  equation  in  addition  to  interest  rate  variable  in  a  framework  of 
heterogeneous firms.  
 
2.3.2 Evidence from indicators of real activity 
Substantial evidence has accumulated to show that investment and inventories are 
affected by the financial circumstances that firms face (c.f. Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen (1988), Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994, Carpenter et al. 1998, Hall et al. 1999, 
Bond et al. 2003, Chatelain et al. 2003). In the US there is a large literature that 
estimates the impact of financial constraints on fixed capital and inventory investment 
by firms beginning with the seminal article by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) 
(FHP  hereafter).  After  determining  whether  firms  were  likely  to  be  financially 
constrained on the basis of their size, dividend payouts and capital structure FHP 
establish whether this characteristic determines how sensitive firms are to the supply 
of internal funds measured by cash flow. The highest sensitivities to cash flow are 
found for firms categorized as financially constrained, and this is taken to indicate that 
financial  constraints  were  binding  in  this  case.  Other  studies  following  the  same 
methodology as summarized by Hubbard (1998) draw similar conclusions. 
  This  important  paper  is  not  without  its  critics.  A  weakness  of  the  FHP 
approach  is  that  financially  constrained  firms  are  identified  with  the  endogenous 
variable dividend payouts. It is suggested that firms with low dividend payouts are 
financially constrained and should show sensitivity in investment equations to cash 
flow. An alternative route for identification is by way of institutional characteristics, 
and there are several papers that follow this approach, including Hoshi et al. (1991), 
who find investment of 24 Japanese firms that are not part of a financial group or 
‘keiretsu’ are more sensitive to cash flow that 121 other firms they examine that are 
affiliated  to  keiretsu.  Povel  and  Raith  (2004)  also  identify  firms  as  financially 
constrained or unconstrained on the basis of the internal funds at their disposal. Their   14 
view is that firms with negative internal funds will be more sensitive to cash flow and 
firms with positive internal funds. Cleary et al (2004) uses current assets less current 
liabilities and inventories over capital, and Guariglia (2004) uses the coverage ratio as 
an alternative measures of internal funds for the same purpose of identifying firms 
likely to be sensitive to cash flow.   
More  recently  Kaplan  and  Zingales  (1997,  2000)  have  argued  that  the 
classification adopted by FHP on the basis of the dividend payout tends to assign 
firms  incorrectly.  Using  more  detailed  information  in  financial  statements  from 
annual reports to classify the same firms over an identical sample period into three 
categories  'financially  constrained',  'possibly  financially  constrained  '  and  'not 
financially  constrained',  they  find  financially  constrained  firms  have  the  lowest 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow. On a larger data set, Cleary (1999) also finds 
that the most constrained firms have the lowest sensitivity. FHP have responded to 
this accusation by suggesting that the extra information in manager’s annual reports 
are  subjective  and  potentially  self-serving  interpretations  rather  than  objective 
statements of fact about the financial position of a firm.  
Although  Kaplan  and  Zingales  (1997)  and  Cleary  (1999)  might  appear  to 
contradict FHP it is consistent to conclude from their work that distressed firms have 
reduced cash flow sensitivity. It then follows that for severely constrained firms the 
relationship proposed by FHP might be reversed. Besides this argument, there are 
other  reasons  to  be  cautious  in  interpreting  cash  flow  sensitivity  as  indicating 
financing  constraints  before  establishing  whether  cash  flow  forecasts  future 
profitability  or  sales  growth  (see  Bond  and  Cummins,  and  Bond  et  al.  2004). 
Investigation of the impact of the mix of finance that the firm obtains on investment 
and employment is less dependent on these weaker parts of the argument.   
On theoretical grounds there are further critiques of the FHP approach. A small but 
significant literature makes the point that cash flow may mis-measure investment 
opportunities.  This point is addressed in empirical studies by Hubbard and Kashyap 
(1992), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Erickson and Whited (2000), Cooper and 
Ejarque (2003), Carpenter and Guariglia (2003). Very recently some recent papers 
question  from  a  theoretical  perspective  whether  the  cash  flow  coefficient  is 
informative about credit constraints e.g. Aydogan (2003), Abel and Eberly (2004). 
Recent evidence from Guariglia (1999), Small (2000) and Vermeulen (2002) 
shows that these effects on real variables can also be found in European countries.   15 
Guariglia (1999) considers UK manufacturing firms in a panel spanning 1968-1991. 
The  firms  are  classified  into  financially  constrained  firms  and  those  that  are 
unconstrained. Using the coverage ratio, the short-term debt to sales ratio, and the 
leverage ratio to indicate the balance sheet position of firms, and a dummy variable to 
indicate the stage of the monetary cycle (broadly recessions and expansions), these 
variables are interacted in order to establish the sensitivity of inventory investment to 
financial conditions. The results indicate that inventories of the constrained firms are 
more sensitive to financial conditions than those of the unconstrained firms.  A similar 
conclusion is found by Small (2000) over the period 1977-94 for quoted UK firms 
drawn from Datastream. 
Vermeulen  (2002)  takes  data  from  the  BACH  database  for  manufacturing 
firms for four large EU countries, Germany, France, Italy and Spain for the period 
1983-1997, separating them into different industries and firm sizes (small, medium 
and large). Identifying the behaviour of the cycle using industrial production data, he 
then considers the effects of financial health in ‘downturns’ and ‘out of downturns’. 
Financial health is measured using ratios of total debt to total assets, short-term debt 
to current assets, short term debt to total debt and the coverage ratio in much the same 
way as Guariglia (1999). The results indicate that small firms are much more affected 
by the four measures of financial health in periods of downturns than medium or large 
firms, although some medium sized firms with weak balance sheets are susceptible in 
downturns.   
In  general  firms  that  are  financially  constrained,  or  are  small  firms  and 
therefore  likely  to  be  financially  constrained,  have  greater  sensitivity  to  financial 
conditions than larger or unconstrained firms. This being the case, if the financial 
structure of the firm is affected by monetary policy conditions to a greater degree 
according to heterogeneous characteristics such as size, riskiness and indebtedness, 
and if investment in stock or fixed capital are affected likewise, then the financial 
choices of firms will have real implications. The remainder of the paper documents 
the  qualitative  influence  of  firm-specific  characteristics  on  financial  composition, 
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3. Data  
The purpose of the remainder of this paper is to tease out the effects of monetary 
policy on firms according to their type using ratios similar to Kashyap et al. (1993) 
and  GMM  estimations  of  the  real  effects  of  these  compositions  and  financial 
constraints following Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999), Bond et al.  (2003). We do this by 
observing  the composition of corporate finance during periods of monetary policy 
tightness and looseness. We then evaluate the response (if any) of real variables to the 
financial composition after controlling for monetary policy and other influences on 
real activity.  
The basis for our empirical work is the large database of corporate finance and 
activity  provided  by  the  FAME  database  through  Bureau  van  Dijk.  The  FAME 
database  covers  all  UK  registered  companies  offering  up  to  11  years  of  detailed 
information for about 500,000 large, small and medium sized UK companies. The 
great advantage of this database is the large number of firms that are covered, the 
diversity of their characteristics, the relatively long time span of the panel overlapping  
a full monetary cycle with  tight and loose periods of policy, and the coverage of 
unquoted as well as quoted firms. This last characteristic distinguishes the data from 
other sources for the UK such as Datastream since they do not hold data on unquoted 
firms.  
 
3.1 Measuring monetary policy 
Our sample contains a tight and a benign period of monetary policy in the United 
Kingdom  corresponding, respectively, to the tightening of  1990-92, where interest 
rates were increased in order to meet the exchange rate driven objective of monetary 
policy, and the period 1993-99, where the objective of monetary policy was inflation 
targeting,  and  interest  rates were reduced as inflation fell to low levels  by recent 
standards. Our measure of the monetary policy stance is the level of the rate of interest 
set by the Bank of England (the repo rate), which is comparable to the Fed Funds rate 
used in US studies as the preferred indicator of monetary conditions by Bernanke and 
Blinder (1988, 1992), Kashyap et al. (1993), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), and Oliner 
and  Rudebusch  (1996).  Figure  1  indicates  the  behaviour  of  the  interest  rates  and 
inflation over the sample period. 
   17 
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3.2 Sampling procedure and firm-specific characteristics 
The FAME database covers all UK registered companies offering 11 years of detailed 
information for large, small and medium sized UK companies, where size is defined 
in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Definitions of Small and Medium Sized Firms 




Maximum £2.8 million 
 
Maximum £11.2 million 
 
Balance Sheet  Maximum £1.4 million  Maximum £5.6 million 
 
Number of Employees  Max 50  Max 250 
     
   Source: DTI web page.  
 
We  construct  a  sample  of  16,000  manufacturing  firms from the FAME  Database 
extracted by satisfying two of the following three criteria: 
•  Firms whose activity is classified as manufacturing according to the 1992 SIC UK 
Code in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
6  
                                                            
6 For the majority this activity is their primary activity but for 940 firms (5.7 percent of the total sample 
manufacturing is a secondary activity.    18 
•  Firms that were established prior to 1989 and were still reporting in years 1999 
and 2000.
7     
We take particular interest in the specific characteristics of the firms in our sample 
since  we  wish  to  determine  the  behaviour  of  firms  according  to  their  ‘type’.  We 
identify four features with sub-categories as follows: size - small, medium and large 
firms; risk - risky and secure firms; debt - indebted and not-indebted firms; and age - 
young and old firms. Previous studies have tended to address one or possibly two of 
these categories, the most commonly chosen being size. However, there are reasons to 
think that many of these characteristics are important and we should control for as 
many as possible without  exposing ourselves to  the problems of multicollinearity. 
These four measures are chosen as some of the most important characteristics that 
affect a firm’s  access to external finance.    
We divided firms into size categories based on criteria given in Table 1 where 
firms should satisfy at least two criteria to be classified into a group.  
Risk assessments are provided by the QuiScore, a measure produced by Qui 
Credit Assessment Ltd that evaluates the likelihood of company failure in the twelve 
months by giving a number in the range 0 to 100. The analysis is based on current 
conditions and on post mortems of failed companies. The range may be considered as 
comprising five distinct bands, the details of which are reported in Table 2. Firms in 
bands one and two are relatively secure, while firms in band four are four times as 
likely to fail as the firms in band three, and are risky. Firms in band five are almost 
certain to fail unless they take immediate action to remedy the situation. We assess 
relatively risky firms (those in bands four and five) against relatively secure firms (in 







                                                            
7 In fact, only 3 percent of the firms in the manufacturing industry stopped reporting during the period 
1990-1999. This may have stemmed either from a failure of the company or because the company was 
exempted from reporting its performance for a period according to the DTI rules. The sample is not a 
balanced panel because it has some attrition.     19 
Table 2: The QuiScore Measure of Risk 
Band Name  Score  Band Description 
 




Companies in this sector tend to be large and successful public 
companies. Failure is very unusual  
 
The Stable Band   61-80  Again company failure is a rare occurrence and will only come 
about if there are major company or marketplace changes.  
 
The Normal Band   41-60  The sector contains many companies that do not fail, but some 
that do.  
 
The Unstable Band   21-40  Companies in this band are on average four times more likely to 
fail that those in the Normal Band.  
 
The High Risk Band         0-20  Companies  in  the  High-Risk  band  are  unlikely  to  be  able  to 
continue  trading  unless  significant  remedial  action  is 
undertaken.  
 
Source: QuiScore Assessment Ltd. 
 
Gearing of the firm is defined as the ratio of total loans to shareholder funds. 
This measure of indebtedness can be used to determine those firms that are ‘highly-
indebted’ or ‘low-indebted’. We determine these as the firms that have a level of 
gearing in the highest or lowest quartile of the gearing distribution, respectively. 
Using the year of incorporation for all firms we classify firms by their age so 
that those incorporated before 1975 are called ‘old’ while those incorporated between 
after  1975  but  before  the  beginning  of  our sample  are  called ‘young’ firms. This 
measure is relative and the cut off date is arbitrary, but it defines those firms that have 
been in existence for a long period compared to those that are relatively new. 
The distribution of firms across size categories in our sample and the number 
of reported firms by year are shown in Figure 2. The number of medium and large 
firms grew over the sample period parallel to increase in the number of firms that 
reported balance sheet items while the number of small firms grew in the early 1990s 
but declined by mid 1990s. 
 
    20 
 
Figure  3  records  the  distribution  of  firms  across  QuiScore  bands  which 
highlights the impact of the recession in the early 1990s on the firms’ financial health. 
As we might expect the shares of the firms in the fourth and fifth bands are higher 
during the recession (white column) than during the recovery period (shaded column), 
the share of the firms in the secure and stable bands are higher during the upswing 
period. In other words, in our sample we have more risky firms during the recession 
than during a recovery. Other priors can be confirmed with our sample. For example, 
large and old firms have on average higher ratings than small and young firms, which 
have inadequate collateral assets and no track record. The small and the young are 
more likely to be subject to financial difficulties in the period of slowing down, and 




















































































Large Medium Small Number of Reported Firms   21 
 Figure 4 shows the average age of the firm by size in the tight and the loose 
monetary policy periods. It is clear from the distribution that to some extent the larger 
firms are also the older firms, and that the distribution changes little according to the 
monetary cycle. The only change that is discernible is a slight reduction in the average 
age of very small firms, otherwise the two lines for each stage in the monetary cycle 




Figure 3:  Distribution of Firms Across QuiScore 
0
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3.3 The composition of corporate finance 
The data that we examine includes data on all types of debt obtained by firms, which 
is split into short-term and long-term debt, and into bank and non-bank loans. In the 
study of US firms by Kashyap et al. (1993) they compare the ratio of bank loans to 
bank loans plus commercial paper, but in the UK, where there is not a significant 
commercial paper market, the more relevant consideration is the ratio of short-term to 
longer term debt from bank and non-bank sources. Therefore we consider the short-
term debt relative to total  debt, where  short-term debt  refers to the debt with the 
maturity  of  one  year  while  long-term  debt  has  a  maturity  more  than  a  year.  The 
evidence in Figure 5 shows that while short-term debt is made up of a variety of 
components  including  bank  overdrafts,  short  term-group  and  director  loans,  hire 
purchase, leasing and other short-term loans, it is predominantly but not exclusively 
bank finance for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). This is important in the 
context of the debate between Kashyap et al. (1993, 1996) and Oliner and Rudebusch 
(1996) since our ratio or mix variable measures the relative movement of bank loans 
to other forms of finance – and it is important that the other forms of finance should 
show  some  movement  otherwise  the  advantage  of  taking  ratios  is  lost  for  the 
identification exercise. In this paper we focus on short-term and long-term debts and 
on total versus current liabilities which are broad measures of the total debts owed by 
firms. Total liabilities is made of short-term debt, trade credit and total other current 
liabilities that include some forms of finance resembling commercial paper or bonds, 
long term debt and other long-term liabilities. Our measures of financial composition 
for the firm indicate the maturity mix of the debt between short-term and long term 
debt, and the relationship between short-term debt which is mainly but not exclusively 
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Table 3: Distribution of Firm Liabilities 
  Percentiles of the distribution 




25-49 Perc.  50-74 Perc  75-89 Perc.  90-100 Perc. 
1990-1992 Average (1)             
Current Liabilities  85.88  84.21  81.56  79.35  75.80  61.08 
     Trade Creditors  27.00  27.41  32.22  31.11  28.02  23.69 
     Short Term Loans & Overdrafts  21.42  20.11  25.15  30.26  31.58  21.81 
     Total Other Current Liabilities  37.45  36.70  24.19  17.98  16.20  15.58 
Long Term Liabilities  14.12  15.79  18.44  20.65  24.20  38.92 
     Long Term Debt  10.49  11.35  13.20  15.24  17.34  21.40 
     Total Other Long Term Liab.  3.64  4.44  5.24  5.41  6.85  17.52 
1993-1999 Average (2)             
Current Liabilities  82.72  84.84  81.77  81.01  78.13  62.85 
     Trade Creditors  20.46  21.42  25.59  25.94  22.57  13.28 
     Short Term Loans & Overdrafts  31.82  24.50  26.97  31.43  33.77  25.92 
     Total Other Current Liabilities  30.44  38.91  29.20  23.64  21.79  23.65 
Long Term Liabilities  17.28  15.16  18.23  18.99  21.87  37.15 
     Long Term Debt  13.50  10.39  13.80  15.10  17.38  21.44 
     Total Other Long Term Liab.  3.78  4.78  4.44  3.89  4.50  15.71 
Ratios (1)/(2)             
Current Liabilities  1.04  0.99  1.00  0.98  0.97  0.97 
     Trade Creditors  1.32  1.28  1.26  1.20  1.24  1.78 
     Short Term Loans & Overdrafts  0.67  0.82  0.93  0.96  0.94  0.84 
     Total Other Current Liabilities  1.23  0.94  0.83  0.76  0.74  0.66 
Long Term Liabilities  0.82  1.04  1.01  1.09  1.11  1.05 
     Long Term Debt  0.78  1.09  0.96  1.01  1.00  1.00 
     Total Other Long Term Liab.  0.96  0.93  1.18  1.39  1.52  1.11 
 
The distribution of these liabilities is reported in Table 3 for the early 1990s when 
monetary  policy  was  tight  and  in  the  subsequent  loose  period;  these  episodes   24 
coincided with a period of recession and recovery in the UK economy. This means 
that  tabulated  averages  cannot  give  an  unambiguous  indication  of  the  changing 
financial  composition  of  firms  due  to  credit  channel  effects  because  they  cannot 
determine that part of the adjustment that results from the cycle and that which results 
from monetary policy changes.
8  
 
Four stylised facts are uncovered from the sample. First, small firms tend to 
use more short-term finance and current liabilities constitute a larger part of the total 
liabilities for small firms than for large firms. Banks may have avoided extending 
long-term funds to firms who are poor in terms of collateral and track record, and if 
this  is  the  case  then  it  suggests  net  worth  is  a  determinant  of  external  finance 
composition. It may also indicate that smaller firms were more adversely affected by 
the cycle than larger firms. Second, the average short-term debt constitutes a larger 
proportion of current liabilities in the second period compared to the first period. The 
shift in the short-term debt finance between these time periods is more significant for 
small firms than for medium sized or large firms. This result may confirm the fact that 
tight monetary policy leads to a lower level of short-term debt finance for all firms but 
the reduction in the short-term debt finance is more severe for small and weak firms in 
terms of collateral. Alternatively, it may be a reflection of the fact that small firms are 
more severely affected by the cycle than medium or larger firms. Third, small firms 
                                                            
8 Our later analysis using panel regressions controls for the cycle and this allows us to identify the 
changes with monetary policy effects operating through the credit channel. 
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shifted to other short-term liabilities such as trade credit and other current liabilities to 
compensate for the decline in the short-term bank loans in the first period. This is 
documented in greater detail in Mateut et al. (2005). The increase in the short-term 
non-bank liabilities relative to short-term debt is generally claimed as evidence of a 
bank lending channel (Kashyap et al., 1993), while the difference in the composition 
of short-term liabilities across firms size can be considered as evidence of the broad 
credit channel once the effect of the cycle have been taken into account (Oliner and 
Rudebusch, 1996). Fourth, although average long-term debt increases gradually with 
the firm size, the increase in the other long-term liabilities increased very sharply 
implying  that  large  firms  have  greater  flexibility  in  raising  funds  from  non-bank 
sources.  
 
3.4 Cross Variable Correlations 
In Table 4 we record the cross variable correlations between our three independent 
variables  that indicate the financial composition of firms in our sample, and their 
characteristics  given by gearing, age, real  asset holdings, risk  score and  collateral 
assets.  There  is  a  relatively  low  correlation  between  the  explanatory  variables 
suggesting  that  the  information  each  variable  contains  is  independent  of  the 
information in other variables used to explain the variation in the ratios in tight and 
loose periods of monetary policy. The mild positive correlation between the short-term 
debt to total debt ratio (STD/TD) and the negative correlation between total debt to 
total liabilities ratio (TD/TL) and many of the explanatory variables such a gearing, 
age and real assets in the tight period reflects the tendency for firms to obtain more 
short-term debt in total debt during tight periods of monetary policy. The opposite 
signs in the loose period shows that these tendencies are reversed when policy eases. 
A better risk score has a consistent positive effect on both ratios in both periods, while 
having more collateral assets increases total debt to total liabilities but reduces short 
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Table 4: Correlation Coefficients across Variables (p-values in the parenthesis)   
                 
Tight Period               
  STD/CL  TD/TL  STD/TD  GEAR  AGE  RASSET  SCORE  COL 
                 
STD/CL  1.00               
                 
TD/TL  0.84  1.00             
  (0.00)               
STD/TD  0.01  0.00  1.00           
  (0.24)  (0.53)             
GEARING  0.24  0.28  0.00  1.00         
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.93)           
AGE  0.00  -0.03  0.07  -0.05  1.00       
  (0.97)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)         
REAL ASSETS  0.01  0.20  0.03  0.03  0.32  1.00     
  (0.17)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)       
RISK SCORE  -0.01  -0.39  -0.07  -0.30  0.21  0.09  1.00   
  (0.11)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)     
COLLATERAL  0.01  0.15  -0.22  -0.01  0.07  0.10  0.01  1.00 
  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)   
                 
Loose Period               
  STD/CL  TD/TL  STD/TD  GEAR  AGE  RASSET  SCORE  COL 
                 
STD/CL  1.00               
                 
TD/TL  0.79  1.00             
  (0.00)               
STD/TD  0.05  -0.08  1.00           
  (0.00)  (0.00)             
GEARING  0.22  0.24  -0.02  1.00         
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)           
AGE  0.00  0.00  0.01  -0.03  1.00       
  (0.27)  (0.36)  (0.04)  (0.00)         
REAL ASSETS  0.02  0.20  -0.06  0.03  0.30  1.00     
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)       
RISK SCORE  -0.06  -0.34  -0.06  -0.31  0.16  0.04  1.00   
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)     
COLLATERAL  0.00  0.13  -0.30  -0.02  0.07  0.09  0.05  1.00 
  (0.89)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   
Note: STD = short term debt, TD = total debt, TL = total liabilities, CL = current liabilities. 
 
3.5 The empirical approach 
We  consider  the  financial  composition  of  firms’  balance  sheets  based  on  ratios 
corresponding to short-term debt to total debt and total debt to total liabilities. The 
former ratio allows us to make inferences about access to market finance versus bank 
finance while the latter indicates the overall availability of external debt (i.e. total   27 
debt). We observe from the time series of the average values of these ratios that during 
the early 1990s the financial composition varied significantly from the later period of 
looser monetary policy and economic expansion.  






















These  are  the  ratios  we  seek  to  explain  in  our  initial  set  of  estimates  before  we 
examine whether the ratios have explanatory power for real investment in inventories 
and employment. Our assessment focuses on the response of financial composition to 
interest rates after conditioning on other potential influences such as the economic 
cycle and year effects. We differentiate between firms according to asset size, credit 
rating, solvency, indebtedness and age, therefore we can determine whether monetary 
policy tightening influences  firms’ according to  their type. We can then conclude 
whether monetary policy has asymmetric effects for different types of firms.  
We  specify our empirical model for explaining firms’ financial composition 
using the following function.  
MIXi=f(BRATE, MPRp, BRATE*TYPEj, BRATE*TYPEj*MPRp, BRATE *MPRp,  
           TYPEj,  RASSET, SCORE, AGE, COL, GEAR, GDP, YEARD)      
where MIXi refers to the three different ratios STD/TD, TD/TL and STD/CL that we 
use to investigate the financial composition of firms, indexed 1, 2, 3. The explanatory 
variables  BRATE,  MPR,  TYPE,  RASSET,  SCORE,  AGE,  COL,  GEAR,  GDP,  and 
YEARD denote the Bank of England’s base rate, the monetary regime dummies, the 
firm type dummies, real assets, the credit score, the age of firms, the ratio of tangible   28 
assets  to  total  assets,  the  gearing  ratio,  the  GDP  growth  rate  and  year  dummies 
respectively. BRATE*TYPEj, BRATE*TYPEj*MPRp, and BRATE *MPRp are interaction 
terms that capture the impact of firm types and monetary regime periods.  
Two-time period dummies are assigned to reflect two different monetary policy 
regimes,  MPRp,  namely  tight  monetary  policy  period  of  1990-1992,  TP,  loose 
monetary policy period of 1993-1999, LP, respectively.  
TP= 1 if t=1990-1992    LP =1 if t=1993-1999  
    = 0   otherwise            = 0   otherwise  
Firm type dummies (TYPE) consist of eight different binary variables reflecting 
eight different firm characteristics i.e. small, large, risky, secure, young, old, highly 
indebted,  and  less  indebted.  We  could  use  only  one  dummy  for  each  firm 
characteristic,  namely  size,  rating,  age,  and  indebtedness  (as in case  of monetary 
regime dummy) to carry out our regressions but instead we use two dummies for each 
firm  type  to  capture  the  reactions  of  firms  in  the  upper  and  lower  tails  of  the 
distribution. For example, for the size we carry out estimations by using interactions 
for both small and large firms as we do not intend to measure the reactions of the 
middle-sized firms. This method enables us to identify the reaction of firms in the 
tails of firm distribution for a particular type of firms.     
TYPEj = 1    j = 1 ….8     and zero otherwise 
BRATE*TYPEj,  BRATE*TYPEj*MPRp  and  BRATE*MPRp  are  the  interaction 
terms that are vitally important for this study. They enable us to make inferences 
about  the  impact  of  monetary  policy  on  firm’s  financial  behaviour  considering 
different monetary policy regimes and firm heterogeneities. Interaction terms in the 
first group show the extent to which the impact of monetary policy differs across 
firms with different characteristics, while the second group is made up of interaction 
terms that consider both monetary policy regime and firm characteristics interacted 
with the monetary stance variable. The third group identifies the impact of monetary 
policy across the tight policy regime period.  
The interactions terms approach enables us to have a more parsimonious model 
with a larger sample size and thus greater degrees of freedom. Interaction of monetary 
policy stance with firm type, BRATE*TYPE, or with both firm type and sub-periods 
BRATE*TYPE*MPRp do the same job as splitting the data into sub-samples.  
Using this method we expect to find that there is a relationship between the 
monetary stance variable and financial composition, after controlling for firm-specific   29 
characteristics, if there is a credit channel of monetary policy. When monetary policy 
tightens,  we  should  find  along  with  the  earlier  literature  that  credit  supply  also 
tightens, and for certain types of firms this will be reflected in changing compositions 
of finance at such times compared with more benign periods when monetary policy is 
looser.   
For our second question relating to the financial composition and the cash flow 
of the firm to real activity measures we use a different model: 
GINVt  =  f(GINVt-2,  GINVt-3,  GSt-2,  GSt-3,  MIXt-2,  MIXt-3,  CFt-2,  CFt-3,  RINVSt-2, 
RINVSt-3 MIXt-2*TYPEj, MIXt-3*TYPEj, CFt-2*TYPEj, CFt-3*TYPEjj)      
where GINV is the dependent variable the growth in inventories, GS is the growth in 
sales, MIX is the financial composition measure, CF is cash flow and RINVS is the 
ratio of inventories to sales. The MIX and CF variables are interacted with the firm 
type as defined above. First differences of GDP growth, the interest rate, some firm-
specific characteristics, and individual year dummies, are added to the instrument set.  
The model is dynamic and we implement the Arellano-Bond GMM two step 
estimator, which requires the choice of a set of instrumental variables made up of 
suitable lags of the dependent variable, endogenous (or predetermined) variables and 
the first difference of exogenous variables. We use lags of predetermined variables 
and the lagged dependent variables as instruments to obtain consistent estimates and 
we impose the following linear moment restrictions  ] ) [( , 1 , j t i t i it Z E − − −ε ε     for  j= 2,3, 
t=1991, ….., 1999 where Zi,t-j is the instrumental variables matrix.  
We use two lags of the dependent variable, in addition to other endogenous (or 
predetermined) and exogenous variables as explanatory variables in the model
9. The 
specification  of  the  econometric  model  is  verified  by  examining  whether  serial 
autocorrelation can be found in the residuals and the whether the Sargan test rejects 
the overidentifying restrictions. 
The dynamic equation for employment growth is similar and is defined as  
GEMPt=f(GEMPt-2, GEMPt-3, GSt-2, GSt-3, MIXt-2, MIXt-3, CFt-2, CFt-3, GRTAt-2  GRTAt-3 GWt-2,  
GWt-3 MIXt-2*TYPEj, MIXt-3*TYPEj, CFt-2*TYPEj, CFt-3 *TYPEjj)      
                                                            
9 Bond (2002) suggests that too many instruments may result in over-fitting biases especially in small 
samples. A restricted set of instruments that is obtained by deleting columns for the least informative 
instruments, generally very early lags of instruments, produce more coherent estimates for long time 
series. For the models that include endogenous variables, over-fitting problem leads to biased 
estimates.      30 
where GEMP is the dependent  variable  the  growth  in  employment,  GRTA    is  the 
growth in the capital stock and GW the growth in wages. All other variables are 
similar to the inventory equation.  First differences of GDP growth, the interest rate, 
some  firm-specific  characteristics, and  individual year dummies, are added to the 
instrument set.  
  In  this  second  set  of  estimates  we  investigate  the  dynamic  response  of 
investment and employment to indicators of firm type such as size, age, riskiness etc, 
but also to the monetary policy conditions, demand conditions proxied by sales, and to 
the financial choices of the firms. If there are real effects of monetary policy, these 
will be captured to some degree by the impact of monetary stance on investment and 
employment decisions of firms, and firm-specific factors will also play a part. If there 
is additional influence from the financial composition of the balance sheet then this 
will provide strong evidence that financial structure of the balance sheet has an impact 
for real decisions. We can also establish whether firms that are likely to be credit 
constrained show sensitivity in inventory investment and employment equations to 
cash flow according to firm types.  
 
4. Results 
Our first set of results in Table 5 indicates the response to a one percentage point 
change in the interest rate during the tight period of monetary policy for each of the 
financial ratios – short-term lending to current liabilities, and short-term debt to total 
debt. Types of firms that are likely to be credit constrained will have negative and 
significant responses to interest rate tightening while those that are constrained have 
positive responses to the same interest rate increase.  The table shows that the types of 
firms that might be more vulnerable such as small, risky, young and indebted types of 
firms typically have significant negative signs for both ratios, with a few exceptions, 
while large, secure, older and less indebted firms have significant positive signs. This 
gives a clear indication that the former type of firms on the upper row of the table  
experience a reduction in short-term debt relative to total debt when interest rates 
increase and are more likely to be credit constrained in some respects than the firms in 
the lower row, adjusting the composition of their finances as a consequence.  
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Table 5: Response in financial ratios to interest rates by type of firm 
Type  Small  Risky  Young  High Debt 
Response in STD/CL  -0.036***   -0.016  -0.038***  -0.003*** 
Response in STD/TD  -0.083***  -0.005  -0.090%***  0.041*** 
Type  Large  Secure  Old  Low Debt 
Response in STD/CL  0.035***  0.001***  0.012***  0.015*** 
Response in STD/TD  0.105**  -0.018*  0.047***  -0.083*** 
 Notes: the responses in each case report the response in the financial ratio to a 1% increase in the 
interest rate in the tight period of monetary policy and its significance level. STD = short-term debt, CL 
= current liabilities, TD = total debt. Significance is indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
 
The fact that small, risky, young and high debt firm responses have negative signs 
indicates that they reduce their short-term debt in current liabilities and in total debt as 
interest rates increase. This is consistent with the hypothesis that some of the small 
and young firms are excluded from the short-term debt market in periods of tight 
monetary policy. Large, secure, old and low debt firms typically increase their short-
term debt relative to current liabilities and total debt in tight periods of monetary 
policy. The thinking here is that although the cost of borrowing has increased for all 
types of debt for these types of firms, they gain greater access to shorter-term debt 
compared to longer-term debt, because suppliers are more likely to prefer to lend short 
in tightening conditions. In one respect the firms are constrained (they cannot access 
as much long-term debt as they would like) but these firms can access short-term debt. 
The extent to which firms become more sensitive to increases in interest rates 
as policy shifts from a loose stance to a tight stance is indicated in Table 6. This table 
presents the ratio of the responses in tight versus loose periods of monetary policy 
when interest rates increase by a percentage point. We use the measure of short-term 
to  total debt to  indicate the extent to which firms adjust the composition of their 
liabilities on the balance sheet. Small firms and young firms stand out as particularly 
sensitive  during  tight  periods  of  monetary  policy,  because  they  have  high  ratios, 
compared with large and old firms, which are in excess of five times the sensitivity in 
loose periods. The differences in the responses between tight and loose periods are not 
so stark for risky versus secure firms or highly indebted versus low debt firms.  
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Table 6: Relative responses to interest rates in periods of tight and loose policy by 
type of firm 
Type  Small  Risky  Young  High Debt 
Relative response in STD/TD  5.19  2.50  5.50  2.00 
Type  Large  Secure  Old  Low Debt 
Relative response in STD/TD  1.50  3.00  1.47  1.00 
 Notes: the responses in each case report the relative response in ratio of short-term debt to total debt 
with a 1% increase in the interest rate in the tight period versus the loose period of monetary policy. 
STD = short-term debt, TD = total debt. 
 
In Table 7 we report the excess sensitivity of firms according to their type in tight 
periods of monetary policy. The figures show the degree to which comparable firms 
differ  in  their  responses  to  interest  rates  according  to  several  characteristics  by 
adjusting their financial composition as interest rates increase in tight periods. The fact 
that all the responses are greater than one indicates that there is excess sensitivity to 
interest rates among the more vulnerable types of firms namely small, risky, young, 
and indebted firms.  
 
 Table 7: Excess sensitivity of the response in financial ratios by type of firm in 
tight periods of monetary policy 
 






High Debt v. 
Low Debt 
Response in STD/CL  1.90  1.03  1.65  1.28 
Response in TD/TL  1.08  1.14  1.00  1.64 
 Notes: the excess sensitivities are the relative responses in tight periods of monetary policy by types of 
firms that are comparable. STD = short-term debt, CL = current liabilities, TD = total debt, TL = total 
liabilities. 
 
Our second set of results report the responses of real activity variables such as the 
growth  in  inventory  investment  and  in  employment  to  changes  in  the  financial 
composition  of  the  firms’  balance sheet after controlling for monetary conditions, 
demand effects and firm-specific characteristics. Table 8 summarises the findings by 
reporting the sign and significance of the response to the ratio of short-term debt to 
current liabilities. With exceptions of large firms the responses are positive and highly 
significant  for  both  the  growth  of  inventories  and  growth  of  employment.  This 
suggests that firms are sensitive to the composition of their balance sheets and respond 
to changes in the balance sheet that are brought about by monetary policy through the   33 
credit  channel.  It  is  worth  pointing  out  also  that  these  effects  are  detected  after 
controlling for the impact of monetary policy on inventory and employment growth 
through interest rates.  
A further supporting argument for the importance of credit conditions on real 
activity of firms is the significant positive effect of cash flow. If firms are not credit 
constrained  they  should  not  be  sensitive  to  cash  flow  since  they  are  not  solely 
dependent on internal funds. In the results we report we find that for all firms cash 
flow is important. 
   
   Table 8: Response of real activity to financial composition and cash flow  
Financial Composition         
  Small  Risky  Young  High Debt 
Response in inventory growth  0.345***   0.086***  0.167***  0.247*** 
Response in employment  0.467***  0.085***  0.159***  0.098*** 
  Large  Secure  Old  Low Debt 
Response in inventory growth  -0.058***  0.278***  0.296***  0.231*** 
Response in employment  -0.008***  0.088*  0.069**  0.139*** 
Cash Flow         
  Small  Risky  Young  High Debt 
Response in inventory growth  0.036***   0.025***  0.032***  0.025*** 
Response in employment  0.126**  0.043***  0.009***  0.037*** 
  Large  Secure  Old  Low Debt 
Response in inventory growth  0.007***  0.038***  0.005***  0.040*** 
Response in employment  0.018*  0.073***  -0.004***  0.046*** 
 Notes: the responses in each case report the magnitude and significance of the response of real activity 
variables to the ratio of bank loans to current liabilities, and to the measure of cash flow. Significance is 
indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
 
Our results for the United Kingdom relate to the period of loosening monetary policy 
and general expansion after an episode of recession. The findings indicate a positive 
relationship between the ratio of short term debt to current liabilities and real activity 
variables  such  as  the  change  in  inventory  investment  and  employment.  We  can 
therefore confirm the procyclical relationship between inventory investment and short-
term debt identified in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996). Kashyap, Stein and   34 
Lamont (1994) also find a positive relationship between changes to inventories and 
financial constraints, but their US study implies this is binding mainly for tight periods 
of monetary policy. Our results on employment growth also match those of Nickell 
and  Nicolitsas  (1999),  who  find  that  financial  pressure  has  a  direct  impact  on 
employment  by  firms.  Since  we  find  a  positive  correlation  between  employment 
growth and access to external finance we confirm their result in a later sample.  
 
5. Conclusions and future directions 
The  results  reported  above  indicate  that  for  the  United  Kingdom  there  is  strong 
evidence  of  a  change  in  the  composition  of corporate  financial  structure over  the 
course of the monetary policy cycle. This changing structure in turn affects the real 
activities of firms measured by inventory investment and employment growth. This is 
a confirmation of other studies using UK panels from earlier sample periods such as 
Bond  and  Meghir  (1994),  Guariglia  (1999),  Nickell  and  Nicolitsas  (1999),  Small 
(2000) and Bond et al. (2003) to name but a few. The question we need to address in 
conclusion is whether this is a representative result that applies to other countries. The 
most intensively studied economy, the United States, seems to have a comparable 
experience as results from Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1992), Fazzari et al (1988), 
Kashyap et al. (1993), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), document. However, there are 
reasons to be more cautious about other economies with differing financial structures 
and industrial organisations such as Japan and the eurozone countries.  
The first reason to explore more widely to investigate the response of financial 
composition  to  the  monetary  policy  cycle  and  the  behaviour  of  real  activity  to 
financial liability structure is that the response is determined to some degree by the 
financial  system  in  each  country.  Financial  systems  deal  differently  with  the 
asymmetric information problem from country to country. It is possible that firms in 
more market-oriented financial systems,  such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom,  show  greater  evidence  of  changing  financial  composition    because  the 
markets in a wider range of financial liabilities are more developed and are accessible 
without prohibitive barriers to entry. This may manifest itself in lesser sensitivity to 
cash flow and the financial composition in employment and investment equations than 
for more relationship based (bank oriented) economies. Allen and Gale (2000) indicate 
that  there  are  significant  influences  on  credit  and  financial  composition  from  the 
structure  of  the  financial  system.  The  United  States  and  the  United  Kingdom  are   35 
identified as a more market-based systems in which firms raise the majority of their 
finance from retentions and a greater part of the remainder from market sources as 
opposed  to  loans.  Germany  and  France  by  contrast  raise  much  less  finance  from 
internal sources, and rely more heavily on banks: the percentages of funds obtained 
from banks in Germany and France is roughly double that of the US and the UK. 
Equity market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP is far higher in the UK than in 
Germany,  and  corporate  control  is  exercised  by  the  financial  markets  rather  than 
banks. A study of investment in fixed capital in Belgium, France, Germany and the 
UK by Bond et al. (2003) shows different sensitivities to cash flow from countries 
along the organisational spectrum
10. The financial system argument infers that the 
arrangement  of  financial  systems  may  offer  incentives  and  constraints  on  the 
adjustment of balance sheets that creates the differences in the responses of financial 
composition, inventory investment and employment across countries.  
  A second possible reason to be cautious about the interpretation of our results 
is that firm and industry level characteristics may be correlated, and specific to a 
particular sample or country. We condition for firm-specific effects such as size, age, 
risk and debt and find that financial composition varies with one or more of these 
characteristics. Technically, there could be some circularity in the reasoning here since 
-  as  Eichenbaum  (1984)  pointed  out  -  it  is  difficult  to  know  whether  a  firm  is 
financially  constrained  because  it  is  small,  or  small  because  it  is  financially 
constrained. Risky firms are often high debt firms, while secure firms are low debt 
firms, but other than these related attributes (and the expected negative correlations 
between old and young, small and large firms etc) the correlations between variables 
should be low. For our sample we find that the correlation between size and other 
characteristics  is  low,  and  there  are  no two  characteristics  that  have  a correlation 
greater than 0.46 in absolute terms. Although we might expect size to be correlated 
with other characteristics that indicate firms are less likely to obtain external finance, 
we find that not all small firms have other adverse characteristics from the point of 
view of gaining access to external finance. Nevertheless the impact of scale, riskiness, 
indebtedness in an absolute sense on the behaviour of firms in particular samples or 
countries. 
                                                            
10 Bond et al. (2003) take the financial system to be an important consideration in explaining cross-
country differences in cash flow sensitivity, although they are careful to state that other factors might 
be the cause of the differences, and state that more research is needed.   36 
Third, the effects of industrial structure may have a distinct influence on the 
sample composition and may be responsible for the results for particular countries. 
Should the industrial composition change, then the responses of the country over the 
monetary cycle may be more or less pronounced. Recent evidence documents that  
differences  in  industry  characteristics  are  important  determinants  of  investment 
sensitivity to cash flow. For example Dedola and Lippi (2004) and Peersman and 
Smets (2004) have found industries differ widely in terms of characteristics such as 
the  capital-intensity  or  borrowing  capacity  and  that  these  features  then  affect  the 
sensitivity of investment to indicators of credit constraints. These differences between 
industries are powerful enough to dominate the differences between countries. 
These reasons act as a prompt to further research on a range of other countries 
where these features can be measured and their influence documented. Responses in 
financial liabilities and real activity may be driven by deep features of the financial 
system and the firm or industrial composition of country samples, but only further 
research will find out the extent that these issues matter. Some research by Angeloni et 
al. (2003), Bond et al. (2003), Chatelain et al. (2003) has begun to make comparisons 
between countries in the eurozone. What seems to be evident at the present is that for 
more market based economies such as the United States and the United Kingdom, 
where access to external finance from market sources is widespread, the composition 
of  finance  varies  over  the  monetary  policy  cycle  and  significant  variation  in  the 
growth of inventory investment and employment results.  
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